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PUBLIC POLITICAL NARRATIVES: DEVELOPING A NEGLECTED SOURCE 
THROUGH THE EXPLORATORY CASE OF RUSSIA IN THE PUTIN-
MEDVEDEV ERA
The place of narrative in political  science is one of those questions that resurfaces with 
regularity  in  debates  over  the  nature  of  the  discipline.  In  Mark  Bevir’s  overview of  the 
development of Anglo-American political studies from the late 19th to the start  of the 21st 
centuries,  narrative stands as the other  to  science.  Bevir  charts the decline of  narrative 
political  studies to be replaced by the search for  more generic,  scientific,  and predictive 
models, before positing a partial return of narrative, albeit sceptical narrative (Bevir 2006). 
Attempts to reconsider narrative as a valid political science approach indeed arose around 
the turn of the current century, sparking debates about the relationship between narrative 
and the questions of generalisability, evidence, and causality which lie at the heart of political 
science (Griffin 1993; Bates 1998; Patterson and Monroe 1998; Lynch 2005; Bevir 2006). It 
is striking though that such debates focus exclusively on the use of narrative by scholars. 
What they omit is the use of narrative by political actors themselves. Whilst scholars debate 
the relevance and rigour of narrative explanations, political actors employ them habitually in 
communicating with the public. A good story can boost popular support for a party, politician, 
or  regime,  touching the populace in  a  more elemental  and powerful  way than detailed, 
intellectually robust, but dry-as-dust policy proposals. Surprisingly, however, analyses of the 
public political narratives employed by political actors are rare, and where they do exist, their 
focus tends to be less on the narrative per se, and more on its performance and its impact 
on an audience (Ku 1999; Alexander 2011).
The central tenet of this article is that, given the wide use of public political narratives in the 
political world, the lack of analysis of these  as narratives merits attention, representing a 
lacuna which can be addressed by the use of  the  tools  of  narrative  analysis.  Such  an 
approach facilitates a focus not so much on the narrative’s external reception, but rather on 
its essential nature and what it reveals about its narrators. To know someone’s story is to 
more accurately make sense of,  explain, even predict  their  actions (Somers and Gibson 
1994: 61). The exploratory case presented here – the narrative employed by the present 
Russian regime – illustrates how narrative analysis contributes to an holistic understanding 
absent from overly atomised accounts of the regime’s policies. My aim is therefore twofold: 
relatively narrowly, to analyse the public political narrative of the Putin-Medvedev regime in 
Russia in order to draw out its motivations, worldview, and inconsistencies; more broadly, to 
offer an example through this exploratory case of how the techniques of narrative analysis 
provide explanatory, critical, and predictive insights into a polity. The article concludes by 
returning to the question of generalisability.
Narrative Analysis in Politics
There is a distinction to be drawn between the use of narrative explanations by political 
scientists and the study of narratives themselves as used by political actors. Clear as this 
distinction may appear when starkly stated, the movement away from narrative explanations 
on the part of political scientists over the past several decades appears to have adversely 
affected the study of  narrative  approaches more generally.  Cecelia  Lynch,  in  noting  the 
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influence of narratives on how we perceive the world and construct moral norms ‘about the 
way things were, are and should be’, emphasises too that some scholars, especially in the 
United States, are suspicious of the role of narrative in positivist social science and objective 
analysis (Lynch 2005: 158). Mark Bevir’s account of the development of political studies over 
the past century or so argues that an increasing focus on atomistic analytic approaches, 
‘broke up the continuities and gradual change of elder narratives by dividing the world into 
discrete, discontinuous units’. Instead of developmental stories and their tellers, ahistorical 
and  impersonal  typologies  and  constructs  came  to  dominate.  The  modernist  empiricist 
approach  rejected  the  unfolding  story  in  favour  of  classification,  correlation,  and 
functionalism (Bevir  2006:  588,  591).  Without  gainsaying  the value  or  otherwise  of  this 
process  as  a  whole,  from  the  perspective  of  the  study  of  narrative,  the  increasing 
minimisation of the role of historical development, contingency, and agency is unhelpful. 
The  ‘Perestroika  debate’  in  US  political  science  in  the  early  years  of  this  century  saw 
narrative discussed in terms of the quest for rigour and objectivity (Monroe 2005), with the 
question  raised  of  whether  an  overly  prescriptive  approach  to  methodological  rigour 
obscures the unexpected and unstable elements of  politics which narrative more readily 
highlights (Migdal 2001: 24; Lynch 2005: 158). Again, the notion that for scholars to resort to 
narrative explanation is unscientific threatens to spill over into the idea that the identification 
and study of narratives in the political world similarly lacks the methodological capacity to 
deliver objective insight.  Whilst  the ‘Perestroika debate’ as a whole revolved around the 
alleged dominance of quantitative over qualitative approaches in the US political science 
establishment, others challenge the very notion of a dichotomy between quantitative and 
qualitative approaches where narrative sits firmly in the latter camp (Caporaso 2009). Robert 
Bates proposed a bridging of apparent paradigmatic gaps in his book  Analytic Narratives 
(1998),  which  emphasised  the  place  of  ‘coherence,  logic,  fit  and  full  and  appropriate 
evidence’ in narrative (Lynch 2005: 160). In other words, he proposed a narrative approach 
which uses more positivist and empiricist methods to ‘fill in the gaps’ between stages of a 
narrative  explanation  by  focusing  on  the  mechanisms  producing  particular  political 
outcomes, thereby marrying the specific and the generic (Bates 1998: 13; Caporaso 2009). 
The message was clearly that, scientifically speaking, it is legitimate to construct a story by 
joining  a  series  of  instances  of  empirical  research,  but  that,  absent  so  robust  a  base, 
narrative alone is insufficiently rigorous and analytical, leaving scientific gaps unfilled. Such a 
stance concerns itself with narrative explanation as a tool of the social scientist. The danger 
is that downplaying the role of narrative as an explanatory tool in the sphere of scientific 
explanation,  however  legitimate  that  may  be,  has  the  unintended  consequence  of 
diminishing the weight given to analysis of narrative content when political actors themselves 
employ  this  explanatory  tool.  The  paucity  of  literature  on  the  content  of  public  political 
narratives suggests that this unintended consequence has indeed occurred.
The strengths and weaknesses of the narrative approach to politics are bound up in these 
questions of generalisability and specificity. If the use of narrative by scholars represented a 
renunciation of scientific  rigour,  then why take seriously the narratives of political  actors, 
mired in specific circumstances and unlikely to provide much in the way of generalisable 
insight? Patterson and Monroe, in their 1998 overview of the study of narrative in political 
science, noted this scepticism (Patterson and Monroe 1998: 320). It is notable that nowhere 
did  they  find  examples  of  research  on  the  sort  of  public  political  narrative  which  this 
exploratory case represents.  I  am not  talking here about  metanarratives,  which work by 
‘erasing  their  own  history  and  particularity’  (Patterson  and  Monroe  1998:  326),  and 
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displaying in their universal abstraction the paradoxical quality of ‘denarrativization’ (Somers 
and Gibson 1994: 63). My focus is rather on political actors’ temporally and spatially defined 
narratives. As noted above, social science considerations of narrative rarely touch on these 
more formal and public political narratives, particularly the narratives of political regimes. In 
the field of social theory, Margaret Somers and Gloria Gibson have, for example, offered a 
four-fold  typology  –  ontological  narratives,  public  narratives,  conceptual  narratives,  and 
metanarratives – which concerns itself primarily with the narratives of individuals and society, 
rather than with public political narratives. In their definition, an ontological narrative provides 
a  sense  of  self  and  so  links  to  agency,  since  understanding  conceptualisations  of  self 
informs understanding of actions. Their second category, public narrative, refers back to the 
individual, and the way in which narratives of institutions and organisations inform how social 
actors understand themselves within a wider context (Somers and Gibson 1994: 61-63). 
None of the four types of narrative identified by Somers and Gibson from a social theory 
perspective capture the element of public political narratives of interest to this article. 1 Public 
political narratives represent and provide self-conceptualisations of and for their narrators, 
the political actors, be they public individuals, parties, or regimes. They may or may not be 
widely understood or accepted by the public beyond the political actor-narrators, but the 
narrative  itself  informs  our  understanding  of  the  motivations  and  actions  of  the  political 
actors. My central concern here is not with the outward effect of narrative, such as its role in 
mythmaking, collective memory and nation-building (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Smith 
2002),  or  in  political  performance  (Alexander  2004;  2011),  but  with  a  more  neglected 
question; in what ways does analysis of a public political narrative illuminate its narrators’ 
norms, priorities, future intentions, concerns, incoherencies, and so on?
Patterson  and  Monroe’s  overview of  the  place  of  narrative  analysis  in  political  science 
confirms the paucity of academic engagement with public political narratives when it comes 
to using the techniques of narrative analysis. They note how narrative analysis has been 
used at the macro level to explore cultural  contestation – for example,  portrayals of  the 
American dream in film – but again the narrative studied is not the formal narrative of a 
political  actor.  They  review  too  structuralist  and  post-structuralist  conceptualisations  of 
narrative, though, as with discourse theory, this literature deals more with understanding and 
interpreting  meanings  (Howarth  2000:  128),  rather  than  focusing  on  how  analysis  of 
narrative structures and their causal explanations provides insight into policy enactment and 
intentions.  Similarly,  approaching public  political  narrative  from a communications  theory 
perspective  draws  focus  onto  questions  of  interpretation,  reception,  and  social  power 
relations and away from the policy aspects with which narrative analysis deals. 
On the  rare  occasions where  narrative  analysis  is  used in  relation  to  official  state-level 
political texts, the texts in question are not always what we would recognise as narratives. 
One recent analysis essayed a narrative approach to the Soviet and Russian constitutions 
since  1924  (Schmid  2010).  Constitutions,  however,  are  not  explicit  and  straightforward 
narratives  and  nor  are  they  written  as  such.  A public  political  narrative  consists  of  a 
sequential  account  given  by  dominant  political  actors  connecting  selected,  specific 
developments  so  as  to  impose a  desired order  on  them.  So,  the  narrative  of  a  state’s 
development, such as that employed by the Putin project in Russia, seeks to impose order 
1 The latter two narrative types have less relevance than the former two to the exceptionalist 
narratives of political actors; conceptual narratives are constructed by social researchers to 
show connections in society, metanarratives are generalised abstractions.
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on disparate events by selecting, connecting, and interpreting them within the context of a 
developmental  story,  complete  with  causal  links.  At  the  orchestration  of  the  narrator(s), 
particular events are placed in a particular context for a particular purpose (Griffin 1993: 
1097). Such a process invokes stability, progress, and the important role of the narrative’s 
authors. It creates too a normative conceptualisation of the world as the regime believes it is 
or ought to be, combining known facts with imagined wholes (Jenkins 1995: 134-35; Lynch 
2005: 161). 
The task of the narrative method consists primarily in analysing the elements of the story 
told. Somers and Gibson propose a useful, if a little overprescriptive, four-part definition of 
narrativity suited to social science, consisting of relationality of parts, causal emplotment, 
selective appropriation, and temporality-sequence-place (Somers and Gibson 1994: 59-60). 
Baker reduces the Somers and Gibson definition to three elements – relationality, causal 
emplotment, and selective appropriation – and adds a fourth from Jerome Bruner, namely 
narrative accrual (Bruner 1991; Baker 2005:  8-9).  What do these mean? Relationality of 
parts  refers  to  the  combination  of  events  or  narrative  elements  into  a  whole.  Such 
combinations  gain  significance  through  causal  emplotment,  which  provides  a  normative 
interpretation, ostensibly explaining why events turned out the way the narrative suggests 
they turned out. Constructing a narrative requires the selective appropriation of events and 
other elements, omitting those occurrences which do not fit. Finally, narrative accrual refers 
to ‘the process of repeated exposure to a narrative or set of narratives leading to the shaping 
of a culture, tradition, or history’ (Baker 2005: 8-9). In the case of a state, the ruling regime 
repeatedly  re-tells  and  adds  to  the  narrative,  since  narratives  are  developmental  and 
dynamic by nature. They retain relevance by being ‘reactive to daily life’ (Migdal 2001: 24; 
Lynch 2005: 158). 
In sum, the present article argues for public political narratives used by political actors to be 
addressed  more  explicitly,  using  appropriate  methodological  tools,  specifically,  the 
techniques of narrative analysis. A study of the narrative employed by the Putin-Medvedev 
regime in Russia contributes as an exploratory case to a deeper understanding of how such 
interrogation of a state’s public political narrative can provide an holistic and critical account 
of  its  development  and  intentions.  The  critical  approach  insists  on  a  nuanced  stance 
between the simple acceptance or rejection of a narrative. For example, recent scholarly 
discussion  of  the  development  and  promulgation  of  Putinism’s  central  themes  in  both 
western  and  Russian journals  has focused  on the concept  of  propaganda (Liñán  2009; 
Belousov 2010). Where narrative analysis talks of narrative accrual, Miguel Vázquez Liñán 
prefers ‘the imposition of the monologue of power’ and, using the Russian case, rails against 
the ‘myths’ promulgated over the past decade by Putin’s ‘propaganda of fear’ (Liñán 2009: 
138). Such a focus leads to analysis of the validity of content as truth, whereas the narrative 
approach,  whilst  not  ignoring  the  notion  of  validity,  privileges  temporality,  contingency, 
agency, and the normative. Methodological motivation comes here from a commitment to 
taking  seriously  what  political  actors  say  about  themselves  and  their  projects  as  a  key 
source  of  insight  into  both  worldview  and  policy  direction,  since  understanding  self-
conceptualisation  informs our  understanding of  motivations  and actions.  The exploratory 
case of the Putin-Medvedev narrative in Russia contributes an exemplum of how analysing a 
public political narrative provides insights into the narrator-actors’ political priorities, making 
sense of policy choices and revealing future concerns.
4
The content of the Putin-Medvedev narrative
The public political narrative developed in 21st century Russia under Presidents Putin and 
Medvedev provides an exploratory case for the application of the techniques of narrative 
analysis.  As  with  other  political  narratives,  it  has  been  analysed  in  different  ways  –  for 
example, as propaganda (Liñán 2009; Belousov 2010), and as ideology (Evans 2008) – but 
not as what it primarily is, namely narrative. My contention here is that identifying narrative 
as such, and employing the tools of narrative analysis to study it, has an explanatory reach 
not present elsewhere. The story told by the political actors may be well known – after all,  
that  is  the  purpose  of  public  political  narratives  –  but  the  application  of  the  narrative 
approach reveals and highlights elements which are subordinate in other approaches, and 
offers  an  understanding  based  on  taking  seriously  the  accounts  of  the  political  actors 
concerned. The stories political actors tell about themselves matter. To identify the central 
elements of a narrative is to focus on those elements which bring consistency and constancy 
to a polity. For example, emphasising that national unity and stability are the non-negotiables 
of Putinism provides a nuance not found in the binary ‘democratic versus non-democratic’ 
accounts of approaches focused on propaganda and ideology, understanding – though by 
no means uncritically accepting – the narrators’ worldview in which stability and unity do not 
oppose but  are essential  to  democratic  development.  The subjective  nature  of  narrative 
facilitates  the  identification  of  actors’  self-conceptualisations  and  self-imposed  limits  of 
political  actions  and alternatives.   Taken together,  these insights  from narrative  analysis 
retain a predictive capacity drawing on narrative constancy and self-conceptualisation.
Russia’s  ruling  regime has  repeatedly  set  out  the  content  of  Putinism in  a  narrative  of 
Russia’s development. Vladimir Putin came to power, first as acting president, on millennium 
eve 1999, accompanied by the publication of his state-of-the-nation analysis, Russia at the 
Turn  of  the  Millennium,  which  established  the  basis  of  the  Putin  narrative  –  a  Russia 
wracked  by  a  century  of  unprecedented  upheaval,  lagging  behind  the  most  advanced 
countries, relying on raw materials for wealth, with an impoverished people, desperate above 
all for stability and national unity, which could only be achieved by a strong state. Russia at  
the Turn of the Millennium has the key features of a public political narrative. In keeping with 
the Aristotelian  notion  that  effective  narratives  have a  beginning,  a  middle,  and  an end 
(Alexander 2004: 543), it provides a temporally sequential account, setting out Russia’s story 
in sections entitled ‘lessons to learn [from the past]’, ‘the modern situation in Russia’, and ‘a 
chance for a worthy future’. It is spatially specific, focusing on Russia and locating the more 
negative elements of the narrative to the west. It is selective in terms of the events and facts 
appropriated to build up the desired account. It also establishes central motifs, causal links, 
and clear temporal boundaries (Putin 1999).
Since  that  initial  public  statement,  Russia’s  leaders  have  repeated  and  developed  the 
narrative  of  Putinism in  annual  presidential  addresses,  key speeches and articles,  state 
symbols and public holidays, lengthy phone-in programmes on television, books designed to 
introduce  first  President  Putin  and  then  President  Medvedev  to  the  Russian  people 
(Gevorkyan, Timakova et al. 2000; Svanidze and Svanidze 2008), and many other forms. 
For reasons of space and clarity, the analysis here draws from the narrative as set out by the 
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presidents, Putin and Medvedev, between 2000 and 2010. Their public political narrative, 
however, has been expounded in wider political circles, notably by Vladislav Surkov, a senior 
aide to both presidents credited with developing the key concepts of Russia’s regime during 
these years. Surkov’s own preference for the narrative mode allegedly took on a literal, and 
literary, form in 2009, when he was widely touted as the author of the pseudonymous Natan 
Dubovitsky’s novel ‘Okolonolya’ (‘Close to Zero’), a story of corruption and political intrigue in 
contemporary Russia.
The overarching narrative of the Putin project is well known in terms of content to those who 
follow Russian affairs, although it is seldom explicitly identified and analysed as a narrative 
per  se.  The narrative  content  can be  built  up  from innumerable  primary and secondary 
sources. For the sake of ease of reference, a consolidated account – Chadaev and Loginov’s 
Plan Putina: slovar' politicheskikh terminov (The Putin Plan: A Dictionary of Political Terms 
(Moscow,  2007))  –  provides  the  main  source  here.  Chadaev  and  Loginov’s  book  was 
published  by  Evropa  Press,  established  in  2005  with  the  aim  of  ‘specialising  in  the 
publication  of  political  literature  and  fulfilling  the  direct  propagandistic  purposes  of  the 
Kremlin’ (Belousov 2010:  85).  Since it  predates the Medvedev presidency,  the Chadaev-
Loginov volume is supplemented as a source in the account below by key speeches and 
interviews given by Dimitrii Medvedev.
The narrative of Putinism goes like this. At the end of the 1990s Russia was a country in  
chaos, with a broken economy and a fractured society (Chadaev and Loginov 2007: 78). Its 
federal nature was ineffective, as regions countermanded the writ of the centre (Chadaev 
and Loginov 2007: 99). The state manifested weakness in its failure to fulfil its most basic 
roles, unable to collect taxes in order to ensure adequate security, education, healthcare, and 
law and order (Chadaev and Loginov 2007: 140). Most people sank deeper into poverty, 
whilst the oligarchs squandered the nation’s riches, bought political power, and, acting as an 
‘off-shore aristocracy’, squirreled abroad anything of value, including their capital and their 
families (Chadaev and Loginov 2007: 71, 74-77).  Internationally,  the once great power of 
Russia enjoyed little influence or respect after a decade of kow-towing to the West, whose 
governments had at best disregarded, and at worst connived in, the weakening of Russia 
(Chadaev and Loginov 2007: 120-121). At the turn of the millennium Vladimir Putin came to 
power determined to rebuild a prosperous, stable, and influential Russia. He brought the 
regions back under central control by reforming the upper chamber of parliament, creating 
Federal Districts, and abolishing elections for regional heads. He put the oligarchs’ resources 
at the service of the state. His political reforms resulted in a more effective parliament and a 
party  system  which  represented  national  rather  than  sectoral  and  regional  interests 
(Chadaev and Loginov 2007: 78-81). When the economy grew, the state took tax revenues 
and improved healthcare, education, and social services through general spending and the 
Medvedev-led National Projects (Chadaev and Loginov 2007: 57-64, 122-126). International 
debts were paid off.  With increased investment in the armed forces and a foreign policy 
geared to the national interest, Russia once again became a major player on the world stage. 
As  a  ‘great  power’  Russia  would  never  be  subject  to  the  sort  of  ‘pseudo-democratic 
demagogues, receiving help from abroad’ (Chadaev and Loginov 2007: 114) who lay behind 
the ‘colour revolutions’ experienced in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan. So Russia entered 
the  second  decade  of  the  21st century  in  a  position  to  embark  on  a  programme  of 
modernisation, based on democratic values and institutions, building a technologically smart 
economy (Pavlovskii and Glazychev 2008: 28-29, 40-41). Looking to the future, the role of 
leaders will decline as Russia becomes a society of free and responsible people. Nostalgia 
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and prejudice will give way to a modern, forward-looking nation able to take its place in the 
global economy (Neef, Mascolo et al. 2009).
The narrative parts of Putinism
This is the story that Russia’s leadership has told. Although the narrative is familiar to those 
who know Russia,  it  has – like  other  public  political  narratives  – not  been analysed as 
narrative. Such an approach requires identification and analysis of the narrative parts of 
Putinism, of its motifs, temporalities, symbols, characters and subplots. In this way, narrative 
analysis develops a detailed and holistic understanding of the politics of the Putin-Medvedev 
regime.  Critical  awareness  of  the  regime’s  selective  appropriation  of  narrative  elements 
reveals priorities, policy choices, and future concerns. It should be noted that in discussing 
Putinism in Russia, the election of Dimitrii Medvedev to succeed Putin as president in March 
2008 did not mark the end of what might be called the Putin project. Medvedev came to 
power with a manifesto called ‘Russia 2020’ but known also as ‘Plan Putina’ (the Putin Plan). 
His presidency slotted easily into the developmental story central  to the Putin project.  It 
required no new narrative. 
Central motifs
A narrative’s  central  motifs represent  the priorities to which other  elements take second 
place.  The normative motifs of  Putinism can be enumerated straightforwardly – stability, 
unity,  social  consensus,  centralisation,  a strong state,  sovereignty,  patriotism,  a  droit  de 
regard over Russia’s claimed geographical sphere of influence, evolution over revolution, 
belief  in  the  appropriateness  of  Russian  approaches  rather  than  alien  models  of 
development, and the notion that context trumps abstract theory. Of these, national unity and 
long-term stability are paramount. ‘National unity – the central idea and starting point of the 
Putin plan’ (Chadaev and Loginov 2007: 41) sits alongside stability justifying a myriad of 
monocentric policy measures and being encapsulated in the name of the party of power, 
‘United Russia’. Putinism’s stability is built on a monocentric conceptualisation of political life, 
a syncretic and reconciliatory approach to history, the promotion by various means of social 
consensus, and a commitment to Russia’s own unique path of development. Monocentric 
measures have included: the Law on Political Parties of 2001, which Putin himself called ‘the 
most significant event in the political arena’ in that year (Bacon 2004: 40); the temporary 
increase in the threshold vote required to enter parliament; the replacement of gubernatorial 
elections with a system of presidential appointment; greater control by the state over the key 
broadcast  media;  the  creation  of  political  parties  by  the  Kremlin;  and  the  use  of 
administrative resources in elections. The narrative has appropriated and accrued selected 
motifs,  which  trump ‘lesser’ values,  such as  democracy,  and  when identified  and taken 
seriously, provide a reliable guide to policy priorities.
President  Medvedev  largely  retained  the  central  motifs  of  Putinism,  though  he  brought 
forward a little the liberal notes always present in the project. In 2008 Medvedev put the 
foundation stone of  his presidency in  place in  its first  months,  with the extension of  the 
presidential  term  to  six  years.  A narrative-centred  analysis,  noting  the  central  motifs  of 
Putinism, identifies this as a key event, despite the distractions of the unexpected and more 
transitory crises in that period, namely the August 2008 war with Georgia and the global 
economic crash. Stability lies at the core of Putinism, and Medvedev emphasised this stance 
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both before and after he became president. In an interview with the German magazine Stern 
in summer 2007, he declared, with his familiar overstatement of Putinism’s possibilities, that 
‘we must secure such stability in our state that no one fears for the future’ (Albes and Klare 
2007; Medvedev 2008b).
Narrative analysis brings a focus on the choice of  central  motifs by the Putin-Medvedev 
regime. In doing so it serves to explain both the  consequences of that choice in terms of 
policy priorities and future paths closed off  or opened up, and also the  reasons for  that 
choice.  As the following analysis of temporalities suggests, the narrative’s ‘back story’ of 
territorial fragmentation, excessive regionalism, and a weak state offers explanatory context 
for  its  emphasis  on unity and stability.  The centrality of  this  emphasis  endows it  with  a 
legitimating function, of particular importance in the context of the diminishing legitimating 
role of flawed elections which in turn the narrative of stability itself helps to explain. The 
narrative’s agents benefit from identifying themselves with its central motifs and drawing on 
its  legitimating  role  in  a  mutually  reinforcing  process.  The  connectedness  of  narrative 
elements reifies the narrative itself as an object of critical analysis, enhancing its properties 
of permanence and ‘actorness’ separate from its creator-narrators. 
Temporalities
The narrative method considers how, at the orchestration of the narrator(s), particular events 
are placed in a particular context for a particular purpose (Griffin 1993: 1097). Construction 
of a narrative requires the selective appropriation of events and elements, omitting what 
does not fit. The relationality of these parts is established in such a way as to construct a 
whole, and causal emplotment reveals their normative interpretation. Somers and Gibson 
argue that narrativity requires discerning the meaning of any single event ‘only in temporal 
and  spatial  relationship  to  other  events’  (1994:  59).  In  considering  the  Putin-Medvedev 
narrative from this perspective, the temporal and the symbolic come to the fore.
The first  act of selective appropriation in any story is to establish its beginning – ‘in the 
beginning’,  ‘once upon a time’,  the temporal framing matters.  The narrative of  the Putin 
project has had different starting points at different times. At the beginning of his presidency 
in 2000,  Vladimir  Putin’s public focus was on dealing with the legacy of the Soviet Union, 
which  had  collapsed  almost  a  decade  earlier.  Putin’s  narrative  rejected  the  ideology of 
Communism without junking decades of Russian history. On the one hand he talked about 
the ‘outrageous price our country and its people had to pay for that social experiment’, and 
the ‘historic futility’ of Communism’s ‘blind alley’. On the other hand he refused to deny the 
‘unquestionable achievements of those times’ (Putin 1999). Whereas the Yeltsin regime had 
sought to present Communism as the ‘other’ over which the newly democratic Russia must 
triumph in an elemental struggle for the future, Putinism instead sought a more nuanced 
stance of consensus and reconciliation. 
By some time around the beginning of  his  second term in  office  in  2004,  the  temporal 
framework of Putin’s narrative shifted to focus on the Yeltsin years as his starting point. A 
reluctance to criticise too strongly his immediate predecessor, who effectively placed him in 
office,  was  understandable  in  the  early  period  of  his  presidency.  However,  favourable 
comparisons with predecessors frequently represent a valuable narrative tool in political life, 
as had been demonstrated in the late 1980s by Mikhail Gorbachev’s powerful narrative of 
the Brezhnev years as a pre-crisis era of stagnation. An increasing focus by Putin on the 
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Yeltsin years as the starting point  of the story facilitated by comparison an emphasis on 
stability, economic growth, improved standards of living and the restoration of national pride 
and international standing.
The Medvedev presidency brought a slightly different temporal approach to the Putin project. 
Whereas Putin’s  narrative  habitually  started from the Soviet  years  and then  the  1990s, 
Medvedev instead reached further back and further forward to situate his more reformist 
emphasis. The Medvedev narrative effectively says – I believe a modern democratic Russia 
is being built, but its completion lies some way in the future, because we have inherited deep 
problems rooted in centuries of Russian history. Medvedev overtly distances himself from 
engagement with the recent past. He told Der Spiegel that he believed ‘it would not be quite 
appropriate for me to assess my predecessors’ (Neef, Mascolo et al. 2009). Similarly, in the 
book designed to introduce himself to the Russian people as their new president, Medvedev 
bizarrely claims that he cannot evaluate the Soviet period because he ‘only caught the end 
of it’ (Svanidze and Svanidze 2008: 9). 
The dominant temporality in Medvedev’s narrative is the long-term, be that historically or 
future-oriented. A typical example can be found in his interpretation of one of contemporary 
Russia’s  most  debilitating  problems,  legal  nihilism.  Whilst  Medvedev  gains  credit  for 
acknowledging the problem,  and indeed bringing it  to  the fore of  his  policy agenda,  he 
framed it temporally as ‘something that has roots deep in our distant past. Fifteen years is 
too short a time to eradicate such deeply rooted traditions’ (Medvedev 2008a). In causal 
emplotment  terms,  the  blame for  the  state  of  Russia’s  legal  system today lies  with  the 
imprecise  and  impersonal  ‘distant  past’.  In  his  review  of  2010,  Medvedev  likewise 
emphasised that Russia’s ‘disregard of legislation has been forming for quite a time, not at 
present, and not during the Soviet times, but many centuries ago ...  Do I have a strong 
medicine against  it?  I  will  tell  you the truth – I  do not.  The therapy is  to  be prolonged’ 
(Medvedev 2010c).  Similarly,  in his narratively structured keynote article  Forward Russia! 
(Rossiya, vpered!),  Russia is beset by ‘centuries of economic backwardness’ despite the 
efforts  of  Peter  the  Great,  the  later  Tsars  and  the  Bolsheviks  to  introduce  innovation 
(Medvedev 2009). And when it comes to the country’s social problems:
‘... we only began changing our social system 20 years ago, and I want to stress to you 
that this system is deeply rooted in traditions that cannot be changed overnight. This 
system  was  shaped  by  traditions  reaching  back  centuries.  These  traditions  have 
become firmly entrenched in habit, and they are often a hindrance to our progress.’ 
(Medvedev 2010a) 
When extending  the presidential  term in  2008,  Medvedev likewise emphasised that  ‘the 
foundations  of  our  constitutional  order  have  been  set  for  a  long-term  historical  period’ 
(Medvedev 2008a).  Even the sympathetic interviewers and compilers of the Svanidze and 
Svanidze volume are moved to note that ‘Medvedev is obviously a man of history, in the 
sense that he cannot perceive basic contemporary problems outside of the complex and 
undemocratic history of our state’ (Svanidze and Svanidze 2008: 41).
In Medvedev’s narrative, Russia’s major problems have their roots deep in the past, the post-
Soviet decades represent far too short  a time to deal with them, and their resolution lies 
many years ahead. He was elected on a programme for Russia 2020. According to Igor 
Yurgens,  the head of  the Moscow think-tank,  the Institute of  Contemporary Development 
(INSOR), whose trustees’ council Medvedev chairs, around President Medvedev people are 
‘constantly’ thinking about what Russia will be like 20 years from now (Goble 2010). INSOR’s 
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report, 21st Century Russia: The Shape of a Desirable Tomorrow, looks so far into the future, 
and buys so readily into a long-termist lack of urgency, that it explicitly refuses to be drawn 
on whether the ‘tomorrow’ in question is ‘2020, 2030, or 2100’ (INSOR 2010: 48).
The use of narrative analysis brings a focus on temporality which might otherwise be missed 
by more atomised approaches, and indeed the dominance of the long-term in Putinism, and 
particularly  during  Medvedev’s  presidency,  has  not  otherwise  been  highlighted  in  the 
scholarly literature. Narrative seeks to capture time and apply it in the service of a political 
project. At the heart of the Putin project lies a tension between stability and democracy. We 
have seen that the central motifs of the narrative selectively appropriate stability. Its temporal 
choices  confirm  this  priority,  and  explain  –  or  excuse  –  the  lack  of  progress  toward 
democracy. Putinism presents itself as a long-term project. Vladimir Putin asserted in the 
opening phrases of his first presidential address that Russia faced ‘long-term tasks’ (Putin 
2000b). In 2007, Putin, reviewing his two terms in office, declared that ‘we are still only at the 
beginning  of  the  difficult  road  to  our  country’s  full  and  genuine  recovery’  (Putin  2007). 
Medvedev likewise began his first presidential address by emphasising ‘new plans for long-
term economic and social development’ (Medvedev 2008a). The focus of his annual address 
to parliament in 2010 was ‘our youth and our children’, again asking the Russian people to 
look ahead a generation to a resolution of economic and social problems (Medvedev 2010b). 
Both Putin and Medvedev use narrative to capture time. Medvedev’s narrative pre-empts the 
frequent criticism that all his liberal-sounding speeches and proclamations amount to little of 
substance. Be it the campaign against corruption, support for a freer press, anguish at legal 
nihilism, his supposed desire to see more democracy – in all these cases and more, their 
temporal  framing  as  ancient  problems whose  gradual  resolution  awaits  future  fulfillment 
attempts to rebut the criticism that nothing much has changed in the Medvedev years. The 
unified  narrative  masks  policy  failure  by  (re)defining  temporality.  Such  a  rebuttal  lacks 
plausibility of course for many critics of the regime, but nonetheless carries a resonance for 
the  less  oppositionally  inclined and – more importantly  for  the  purpose of  the argument 
advanced here – indicates how the Putin-Medvedev tandem leadership conceptualises itself. 
Symbols
The  techniques  of  narrative  analysis  bring  a  focus  on  narrative  as  a  ‘constructed 
configuration’, bringing together central themes within a temporal relationship and composed 
of symbolic practices (Somers and Gibson 1994: 59). In a speech to the State Council in 
December 2000, the story Putin told of the Soviet years had both temporal and symbolic 
aspects:
If we accept the fact that in no way could we use the symbols of the previous epochs 
including  the  Soviet  one,  then  we  must  admit  that  our  mothers  and  fathers  lived 
useless and senseless lives, that they lived in vain. I can’t accept it either with my mind 
or  my heart.  There  was  already a  period  of  time  in  our  history when  we  rewrote 
everything anew. We can act in the same way today, too. We can change the flag, the 
anthem and the coat of arms. But in that case it  would certainly be right to call us 
rootless creatures. (Putin 2000a).
The symbols which were adopted by Putin – the Soviet anthem but with new words, the coat 
of arms from the pre-imperial era, and the flag from the imperial period – demonstrated that 
he recognised ‘the complexity of the Russian historical experience and the need to seek 
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inspiration  from  the  entire  Russian  past’  (Godzimirski  2008:  26).  They  sit  well  within  a 
narrative of national unity and stability.  These emphases come together too in the major 
symbolic statement of the Putin presidency, the creation of a new national holiday, National 
Unity Day, to effectively replace the major Bolshevik holiday, Revolution Day. Under Yeltsin, 
Revolution Day – that is, 7 November – remained on the list of national holidays, although in 
1996 Yeltsin downgraded it  and renamed it  the Day of  Reconciliation and Accord.  Putin 
removed 7 November from the list of official holidays. In its place he introduced National 
Unity Day on 4 November. National Unity Day commemorates the liberation of Moscow from 
the Poles in 1612. This event ended the civil war and foreign intervention of the ‘time of 
troubles’ and ushered in the Romanov dynasty, which remained in power until the revolution 
of 1917. 
When National Unity Day was first celebrated in 2005, films and television documentaries 
set out the symbolic narrative (Kraus 2005; Krylov 2005; Skoblin 2005; Butgurlin 2006). They 
drew parallels between the civil conflict of the early 17 th century ‘time of troubles’, and the 
‘time of troubles’ experienced by Russia in the 1990s, a decade described by the memoirist 
Owen Matthews as ‘a story without a narrative’ (Matthews 2008: 5). The implication was that 
just as the Romanov dynasty brought long-term stability in 1612, so the Putin regime brought 
long-term stability after the chaos of the Yeltsin years. Other elements were woven into the 
narrative  around  National  Unity  Day:  it  celebrates  a  Russian  victory  over  western 
domination;  Orthodox  Russia  beating  Catholic  Poland  promotes  the  messianic,  Russian 
nationalist  notion  of  Moscow as  the  ‘Third  Rome’;  and  the  ‘seven  boyars’  who  sought 
personal  wealth  and power  in  league with Russia’s  enemies  abroad in  the 17th century, 
uncannily represent the ‘seven bankers’, major oligarchs of the Yeltsin era, broadly accused 
of the same.
Again,  analysing  the  stories  told  by  the  regime  facilitates  an  understanding  of  political 
identity,  policy  stances,  and  priorities.  Symbols  enhance  the  narrative  and  encapsulate 
political positions. In 2005, for example, the mortal remains of the émigré philosopher Ivan 
Il’in and the Civil War General Anton Denikin were laid to rest at last in their homeland in a 
ceremony presided over by the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Aleksei II,  
and attended by President Putin (Yablokova 2005). This honour bestowed on two men who 
dedicated themselves to fighting the Soviet regime received very little attention in the West, 
whereas positive references to Stalin in Russia tend to provoke headlines suggesting Soviet 
revanchism (Applebaum 2008). A regime which removes Revolution Day from the holiday 
schedules  and  honours  the  White  General  Denikin  does  not  easily  fit  such  a 
conceptualisation,  and  the  focus  on  symbols  within  narrative  analysis  contributes  to  an 
holistic understanding of the regime’s self-conceptualisation and political position.
Agency
A relationship exists between temporal frameworks, agency and causality. Narrative requires 
agency. As Patterson and Monroe set out in their overview of the narrative method in political 
science, narrative ‘involves human beings as characters or actors. These human beings 
have a place in the plot, a role in the story’ (Patterson and Monroe 1998: 316). The place of  
agency in personal narratives is axiomatic. In public political narratives the personal agent is 
less self-evident as the story is of a more impersonal system or regime (Somers and Gibson 
1994:  63).  However,  the temporality deployed in a public  political  narrative can serve to 
define a more personal agent by focusing on, for example, reigns or periods in office, with 
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the decisive dates being the borders between the influence of individuals. In the Russian 
case, the regime’s narrative, as shown by analysis of temporality and symbols, readily takes 
Putin’s election to the presidency in 2000 as the dividing line between the ‘economic and 
political crises of the 1990s’ and the ‘significant successes’ of the Putin era during which ‘the 
population’s income grew by more than two times’ (Chadaev and Loginov 2007: 78). The 
story told by the regime imposes a temporality which draws attention to the agency of its 
leaders, thereby imputing to them causality for policy successes. In fact official data show 
that economic recovery began in 1999, during the Yeltsin presidency and after the financial 
crisis of 1998. 
In public political narratives, political actor-narrators provide positive accounts of themselves 
as ‘heroes or victims’ and their opponents as ‘evildoers or fools’ (Alexander 2004: 551). In 
the Russian narrative, the Putin regime – and particularly Putin himself – is the hero. The 
regular  summer  Putin  photoshoot  illustrates:  Putin  bare-chested  riding  a  horse;  Putin 
crouching in the front of a dinghy, crossbow in hand, ready to loose a tracking device into a 
whale;  Putin  shooting  a  tranquiliser  dart  into  a  tiger;  Putin  playing beach-volleyball  with 
young  bikini-clad  women;  in  all  these  situations  and  more  he  has  been  photographed, 
interviewed and filmed as action man, concerned ‘father of the people’, determined leader, 
moderniser, and muzhik (a real ‘Russian man’). The victims in this narrative are the Russian 
people in the 1990s, left floundering in poverty as the real villains of the piece – the so-called 
oligarchs – plundered the nation’s wealth and gave nothing back. Complex explanations are 
rolled  into  a  simple  narrative  by a  process  of  personalised  selective  appropriation.  The 
identification  of  heroes,  victims,  and  villains  brings  particularity  and  works  against 
generalisability (Caporaso 2009). It enables the regime to identify itself as a particular case 
which justifies particular policy choices over others. The narrative emphasises the regime’s 
conceptualisation of itself as central to Russia’s development and of a strong state as the 
way to protect the Russian people. Its focus on the oligarchs as the villains of the piece 
similarly facilitates a reading of the regime’s normative priorities. For example, analysts and 
political  actors  alike  widely  acknowledge  that  UK-Russian  relations  have  been  at  an 
unusually  low ebb for  a number  of  years.  The identification in  Russia’s  narrative of  the 
oligarchs as villains-in-chief,  when set against the residency of a number of them in the 
United  Kingdom  and  the  failure  of  Russia’s  extradition  requests,  contributes  to  a  fuller 
understanding of this situation. Wicked oligarchs are key characters in the Russian narrative, 
and fighting them matters more than maintaining good UK-Russian relations.
Plots and Subplots
Narratives,  in  the  definition  of  Lawrence  Stone,  writing  in  the  1970s  about  a  return  to 
narrative  in  historical  scholarship,  focus material  into a  single  coherent  story albeit  with 
subplots  (Stone  1979:  3). Russia’s  public  political  narrative  particularly  demands  the 
existence of subplots since its emphasis on unity and stability requires that a relatively wide 
range of opinion can fit within it. Subplots sit within the narrative; they are not alternative 
stories told by those opposed to the regime, but are told by the regime itself. Just as the 
novel  ‘Okolonolya’,  allegedly  written  by  the  ‘Kremlin  conceptualist’  Vladislav  Surkov, 
‘contains several  stories within  the story,  playing back onto each other’ (NATO Defense 
College 2009), so a successful public political narrative contains plot and subplot, providing 
the developmental  flexibility  essential  to  its  usefulness  and  longevity.  As  such,  subplots 
within an approved narrative fit well with analogous elements in Russia’s centrally managed 
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political system. Putin’s United Russia party, for example, contains three political ‘clubs’ – 
liberal-democratic,  social-conservative, and state-patriotic – which have divergent political 
views and yet all sit within the single party. Analysts likewise distinguish between genuine 
opposition in Russia, and cosmetic or semi- opposition, which happily sits within the regime-
approved  political  system  (March  2009).  In  a  similar  way,  the  ‘tandem’  leadership  of 
President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin from 2008 onwards allowed more liberal and 
more statist subplots to exist within the overarching narrative of Putinism. 
From the perspective of narrative analysis, subplots facilitate the development of a dynamic 
narrative and keep potential political pathways open. Russia’s public political narrative of 
incremental progress, stability and unity contains a measure of irresolution, with subplots of 
democratisation and normality present within the central narrative of stability and Russian 
exceptionalism. Narrative analysis, however, distinguishes plots from subplots. Medvedev’s 
apparently  liberal  storyline  subordinates  itself  to  stability,  long-termism  and  Russian 
exceptionalism, for example, in his view that ‘the development of democracy here follows its 
own  laws’  (Svanidze  and  Svanidze  2008:  19).  As  noted  earlier,  the  narrative  retains 
relevance  by  being  ‘reactive  to  daily  life’  (Migdal  2001:  24;  Lynch  2005:  158),  and  its 
continued dominance benefits from different  subplots appealing to different  audiences at 
different times. Clearly though, diverging policy preferences also contain the potential for 
instability.  There  are  real  policy  issues  at  stake  here,  where  slight  differences  can  be 
identified  within  the ruling  regime,  to  do  with,  for  example,  the  role  of  the  state  in  the 
economy, the independence of the judiciary, and the place of political opposition. 
Alternative Narratives, Alternative Futures
Subplots serve a narrative by widening its appeal and keeping potential political pathways 
open. At the same time, their subordination to the plot acknowledges the danger that they 
may themselves become alternative narratives. Drawing on the Weberian notion of counter-
factual  reasoning  as  a  means  of  interrogating  the  importance  of  particular  facts  to  our 
understanding of causal relationships, it is relatively straightforward to isolate specific events 
and construct alternative narratives (Griffin 1993: 1101). A critical reading of public political 
narrative requires an awareness of selective appropriation, and the ability to construct such 
alternative  narratives.  In  the  case  of  Russia’s  public  political  narrative,  for  example, 
Ukraine’s Orange Revolution of 2004 stands for political instability and the manipulation of a 
sovereign state by western intervention, with Vladimir Putin warning against a process of 
‘Ukrainisation’ in Russia (Bratersky and Abdullaev 2010). Were the more liberal subplot of 
the Russian narrative to become dominant, the Orange Revolution could just as easily stand 
for the spread of genuine democracy, the influence of civil society, and a successful struggle 
against corruption and electoral manipulation.
The notion of differing interpretations of isolated events is of course a commonplace, but the 
strength  of  narrative  lies  in  the  causal  emplotment  gained  from linking  events  together. 
Linkages in a narrative make problematic the reinterpretation of isolated elements without 
undermining  the  narrative  as  whole.  As  this  article  argues,  analysis  of  public  political 
narratives provides insight into the worldview of political actors. This in turn has a predictive 
element  in  providing a framework  within  which the reactions  of  these political  actors to 
particular events can be expected to fit. So, for example, in a choice between stability and 
democracy in Russia, stability will win. A more specific example is provided by the August 
war  with  Georgia  in  2008,  when  many commentators  speculated  about  Russian  troops 
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occupying Tblisi and overthrowing the Saakashvili regime. Familiarity with the Russian public 
political narrative indicated correctly that such a move was highly unlikely, since the narrative 
always couches talk of an internationally resurgent Russia in terms of international law and 
the responsibilities of a ‘great power’ (Chadaev and Loginov 2007: 120-121).
In  a  world  where  many  political  actors  appear  reluctant  to  believe  in  universal 
metanarratives, the public political narrative provides a sub-universal, exceptionalist account 
of  a regime’s beliefs  about  the past,  present  and future.  Such an account  paradoxically 
contains  elements  of  the  ideological  metanarrative,  particularly  in  its  future  orientation, 
providing a goal beyond the horizon which justifies political choices in the present. Although 
the  public  political  narrative  rarely  contains  eschatological  grand  theory,  analysis  of  its 
putative ending nevertheless reveals  much.  The narrative of  Putinism  explicitly disavows 
ideological  metanarratives  and in  doing so validates an exceptionalist  approach.  Russia’s 
future, according to its public political narrative, will be as a fair  democratic  society, where 
political freedoms and private property are defended, and a forward-looking young nation 
takes its place in the global economy (Pavlovskii and Glazychev 2008: 29). As noted earlier, 
however, Russia’s narrative places this future at some distance from the present by means 
of a dominant long-termism.  Why hasn’t Russia become a democratic liberal market state? 
Because,  goes  the  argument  made  explicit  by  both  Putin  and  Medvedev,  Russia  is 
exceptional. It has its own deep-rooted problems requiring its own steady solutions. Whilst the 
Putin project has constructed a narrative of  ‘progressive development within a determinate 
institutional, ideological and symbolic order’ (Prozorov 2008: 219), the future orientation of 
the narrative seeks to excuse policy failure and to justify élite continuity. It also enables the 
incoherences within Putinism to be held together: stability and a strong state now in order to 
enable democracy and individual freedoms later.
A critical reading of a narrative’s ending interrogates issues such as the ending’s relationship 
to  current  policies,  to  plot  and  subplot,  to  narrative  temporalities,  and  to  agency.  As 
normative constructs, narratives to some extent represent an imagined present, and their 
endings a dreamt future. Interrogation of the ending in terms of its relationship to the present 
and to the narrative as a whole facilitates a deeper questioning of the narrative’s purpose. 
Does the ending match the story? Would the main characters act in that way? Is the ending 
set in the near future, or in some distant never-never time? The Russian narrative places its 
vision of a democratic, law-governed country with robust political freedoms at a temporal 
distance from its current leaders, whose policies apparently do little to achieve their stated 
aim.
Conclusion
A public political narrative consists of a sequential account given by dominant political actors, 
choosing and connecting specific developments so as to impose a desired order on them. Its 
recurring motifs and symbols identify the narrator-actors’ political priorities, making sense of 
policy choices and revealing future concerns. Where unexpected events arise, the narrative 
provides a guide to likely policy responses. Narratives capture time, and shifts in narrative 
temporalities indicate changes in self-conceptualisation and political priorities. When political 
actors choose the start of their narrative, they reject other beginnings, and so other causal 
factors. Temporal appropriations likewise include or exclude agents. In the same way, the 
relationship between plots and subplots provides an indicator of priorities, policy options, and 
likely policy choices.  The dynamic nature of a public political  narrative benefits from the 
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flexibility present in subplots, and their introduction, downplaying, or re-emphasis represents 
a political signalling process. Nonetheless, limits exist with regard to how much narrators can 
manipulate  a  narrative.  If  its  strength  lies  in  the causal  emplotment  gained from linking 
elements together,  then manipulating too many elements too much risks unravelling the 
narrative, with potential catastrophic results for narrators with regard to their legitimacy. The 
connectedness of a narrative then strengthens the case for it to serve as the object of critical 
analysis,  since it  possesses properties of  permanence and ‘actorness’ separate from its 
creator-narrators.
Taking contemporary Russia as an exploratory case contributes to a deeper understanding 
of how the tools of narrative analysis can be used to shed light on the nature of a public  
political narrative, providing an holistic understanding of its narrators’ politics. The use of 
narrative by political scientists has featured in debates about the discipline for many years 
(Bevir 2006), whereas the use of narrative by political actors has been less prominent in the 
literature. A recent revival of interest in the narratives of political actors has focused on the 
interaction between narrator and audience (Alexander 2004; 2011). The argument of this 
article is that critical analysis of the narrative parts and their construction into a whole has 
explanatory and predictive merit, establishing the framework within which political choices 
are made. What I am concerned with here is taking seriously the stories political actors tell 
as  a  key  source  of  insight  into  their  motivations  and  intentions.  The  tools  of  narrative 
analysis  exploit  this  source.  Whether  the  narrative  is  widely  accepted  or  derided  is  a 
secondary matter so far as this argument is concerned, as is the objective validity of the 
narrative.  The  exploratory  case  studied  here  represents  a  narrative  much  contested  by 
western scholars and analysts,  indeed this  article  similarly casts  doubts on the Russian 
regime’s genuine commitment to elements of the story which it tells. If my contention holds 
up, then narrative analysis provides a useful tool for understanding the polity in question – 
contemporary Russia in this case – and the self-conceptualisation of its political actors.
Questions still remain, however, around the issue of generalisability. Robert Bates’ work on 
‘analytic  narratives’  sprang  partly  from  his  well  known  reservations  about  the  value  to 
political science of exceptionalist accounts in the form of area studies. Bates argued that 
area  studies  had  ‘failed  to  generate  scientific  knowledge’ (Hanson  2009:  159),  and  his 
reservations  about  the  value  of  spatially  specific  accounts  is  apparent  in  the  idea  that 
appropriately  scientific  methods  must  be  employed  to  create  analytic  narratives  (Bates 
1998). The generalisability question throws up clear challenges in relation to public political 
narratives,  which represent  temporally  and spatially  defined exceptionalist  accounts.  For 
now that challenge can be answered in four ways, and with varying degrees of tentativeness 
since there clearly exists scope for further work. First,  the approach of this article offers 
methodological generalisability. It identifies a neglected element of political discourse – the 
public political narrative – and sets out through an exploratory case the potential explanatory 
and even predictive power  of  narrative  analysis.  Taking the narratives  of  political  actors 
seriously as  narratives  offers a fruitful  approach of  wider  applicability.  Second,  in  public 
political narratives the choice of the narrative form lies with the political actor, not the political 
scientist. The existence of public political narratives validates their analysis as such.
Third, when metanarratives dominated political discourse more than they do today, polities 
more readily owned them for themselves, for example, subordinating their temporally and 
spatially specific stories to the Marxist-Leninist metanarrative. However, even with the use of 
metanarratives in public political  discourse declining in recent  decades, the narratives of 
specific polities are still combined into larger wholes which facilitate comparative analysis. 
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For example, Russia’s narrative of economic revival and growing international status has 
been joined together with similar stories in Brazil, China, and India to create the concept of 
the  BRIC states.  What  began  as  a  neat  acronym coined by a  Goldman Sachs  analyst 
(O'Neill 2001), became within 8 years a formal international grouping with its own summits. 
Narratives  have  a  combinatory  quality  stemming  from  their  constitutive  parts,  be  that 
common motifs, common villains, or common futures.
Fourth, and finally, generalisability is a function of the appropriate level of abstraction. I have 
argued that narrative analysis provides an holistic approach to the study of a spatially and 
temporally  defined  polity,  more  holistic  than  might  be  gained  from  the  comparatively 
atomised focus on elements of that polity by the application of generalisable theory. It is not 
this article’s task to decry the latter. Rather I support Hanson and Kopstein’s view that there 
always  exist  ‘temporal  and  spatial  bounds  on  the  validity  of  causal  generalizations’.  It 
remains  the case that  the  task of  holding together  historical  particularity and theoretical 
generalisability stands at the heart of comparative politics (Hanson and Kopstein 2005: 93-
94). 
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